Abstract-The deepening penetration of renewables in power systems has contributed to the increasing need for generation flexibility. Specifically, for short-term operations, flexibility here indicates that sufficient ramp capacity is available to respond to the varying load and intermittent generation. To address the growing needs for ramp capacity, markets for ramp products have been launched in practice such as those in California ISO and Midcontinent ISO. Sometimes, expensive fast-start units must be committed in real time to guarantee sufficient ramp capacity. Occasionally even worse, inadequate ramp capacity from the given generation portfolio might lead to curtailment of renewable generation or load shedding. Therefore, more supplies of ramp capacity are required. In fact, wind power producers (WPPs) are physically capable of offering ramp services, which gives us a potential option. In this paper, we attempt to explore the mechanism and economic impacts of including WPPs as ramp capacity providers. To conduct the analyses, a two-stage stochastic real-time unit commitment model considering ramp capacity adequacy is formulated. Case studies indicate that both the system and the WPPs can benefit in the proposed framework.
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I. INTRODUCTION
M AINTAINING the balance of a power system requires adequate flexible resources to match the varying loads. Poor balancing performance, in a market environment, will usually lead to fierce fluctuations in electricity prices, especially in the real-time (RT) [1] . Keeping this balance is more challenging when facing the deepening penetration of intermittent and uncertain renewable generation [2] [3] . In some markets, the frequency of price spikes is indeed increasing with the changing generation portfolio [4] . In the US, RT markets are usually cleared every 5 min by the RT economic dispatch (RTED) tool [5] . When there are significant variations in net load and the system lack the flexible capacity, the ramp rate constraints in the RTED model could bind, thus changing the resulting schedules and clearing prices.
Current market practices to compensate for such ramp shortages can be categorized as increasing reserve margins, adding offset value to the forecasted load, starting fast-start units, and keeping some additional units online [6] . In the US, some ISOs have launched markets for flexible ramp capacity (FRC) products, including those implemented in California ISO and Midcontinent ISO [7] - [10] . Such products are co-optimized and cleared with energy and other ancillary services. Once they are obtained, the FRCs are withheld to meet the ramping requirements for future periods.
Currently, FRCs are mainly procured in RT markets by adding fixed ramping requirements into the deterministic RTED models [12] . However, the RTED process does not consider the commitment of fast-start units unable to deploy all the available flexibilities in the system. In [13] , the procurement of FRCs is considered in the RT unit commitment (RTUC). In this way, the commitment of fast-start units is connected to the FRC. Nevertheless, RTUC itself is not a market process. Procuring FRC by RTUC will consequently degrade into an out-of-market approach, which departs from the motivation for designing this product. Moreover, it is stated in [9] that because RTED has more accurate information than RTUC, the overall requirements of FRC should be lower and the procurement should be more efficient. To properly integrate this new product into the current markets, there is still a need for market rules of better compatibility.
Recent years have witnessed the development of market clearing tools. And a major trend is to update the deterministic models into non-deterministic ones considering the uncertain loads and renewable generation. Some of the most representative approaches are those based on chance-constrained optimization [14] , [15] , interval optimization [16] , robust optimization [17] , [18] , stochastic optimization [19] , and a hybrid of the above approaches [20] . These approaches are advanced in guaranteeing adequate flexibilities by explicitly considering the underlying uncertainties. Because the need of FRCs is partially driven by the renewables, it is reasonable to embed this product into a non-deterministic framework. In fact, this idea has already been discussed in [7] , in which the authors claimed that better performance can be achieved.
In addition, only conventional units are currently entitled to provide FRCs [21] . However, due to the increasing share of low-marginal-cost variable generation, the traditional FRC resources are less dispatched. Hence, holding to the old rules might lead to more frequent FRC scarcity, which inspires us to consider including extra resources, such as wind power producers (WPPs), as FRC providers. In fact, WPPs do have great controllability, and their potential for providing ancillary services such as spinning reserves, frequency regulation, congestion relief and voltage control have been d discussed by many researchers [22] - [26] . Furthermore, the idea of turning the WPPs into ancillary service providers is now combined with advanced system operation models to derive more sophisticated strategies of utilizing the WPPs' flexibilities [27] , [28] . We follow the ideas in the above works and attempt to explore the possibility of having WPPs provide FRC services.
Adequate incentives are the precondition of utilizing the flexibilities of the WPPs because WPPs themselves are profit seekers [29] . It has been proved by some papers that WPPs can be better off by strategically participating in the joint energy and ancillary market [30] , [31] . It is also significant to guarantee that the WPPs can be properly compensated for providing FRCs before implementing the mechanism. It is expected that the WPPs can benefit the whole system by offering FRCs and helping reduce the use of expensive fast-start units. Therefore, a Pareto improvement can be achieved if some of the benefits are distributed to the WPPs. In addition, measurability is the premise of quantitative incentives. So, the WPPs' capabilities of providing FRC should be carefully defined considering their uncertain and volatile availability.
Furthermore, as we will see in the main text, WPPs bear the risk of being curtailed in the future periods while providing FRCs. Their low marginal cost of production indicates that they do have opportunity cost to provide this product. To investigate the benefits and costs, the RT operation process considering FRC products is modeled as a two-stage stochastic programming problem. The first stage represents the RTUC process and does not include explicit FRC requirements. Instead it addresses the adequacy of FRCs in the second-stage RTED process by making commitment decisions for the fast-start units.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows: studies are demonstrated in Sections IV and V, followed by the conclusions in Section VI.
II. WIND POWER PROVIDING FLEXIBLE RAMPING PRODUCT
FRC is the flexibility reserved in a specific time slot for future use [32] . To satisfy the net load changes and cover the potential unexpected variations, the system must prepare adequate upward and downward FRCs (see Fig. 1 ).
Generally, the FRCs are provided by online conventional units. The units can submit FRC bids, which consist of their operational limits, to the system (currently, only zero-price bids are allowed in CAISO and MISO). Then, the FRCs are jointly cleared with energy and other ancillary services in an RTED model. When the overall ramp capacity is sufficient, the FRC requirement constraints will not bind, leading to zero FRC prices. Otherwise, the schedules of some units will be revised to release more FRCs, resulting in positive FRC prices. If the requirements still cannot be met, the system will be exposed to significant risks. Once the system is unable to follow the changes in the net load, the system will have to deploy regulation reserves by automatic generation control (AGC) on a continuous basis to maintain frequency. More severely, load shedding and wind spillage might occur.
Currently, WPPs are not considered as FRC providers. Instead, they have contributed to the increasing needs for flexibility. However, wind turbines are well controllable. The most common types of wind turbines, which are implemented with power electronic devices and advanced control technologies, are capable of adjusting their active power output rapidly, e.g., 0.05-0.25 p.u./s [33] .
Despite the above facts, WPPs are still excluded from FRC markets. This is largely due to two major concerns. First, from the physical perspective, the availability of wind is uncertain, so a WPP's actual capability of providing FRCs, which is limited by the "real" generation capacity, cannot be perfectly forecasted and guaranteed. This is a major difference between the WPPs and the conventional units. Second, from the economic perspective, to provide upward FRC, the WPP must deviate from its maximum power output status and leave a margin. Additionally, when FRCs are scheduled for a WPP, it is possible that wind spillage will occur during the subsequent periods, as dis- cussed in detail later. In other words, the opportunity costs of WPPs to provide FRCs is relatively high.
For the concern of uncertainty, it should be noted that the RTED/RTUC problems are usually solved with a lead time of 5 ∼ 30 min, and the forecast accuracy is relatively high at the corresponding timescale. According to the NREL report [34] , the normalized Root Mean Squared Forecast Error (RMSFE) of a wind farm with 5-min lead time is approximately 0.01, and that with a 60-min lead time may range from 0.02 to 0.06. Therefore, it is possible that the WPPs' capability of providing FRCs is measured based on the forecast information. In addition, some degree of conservativeness is guaranteed in the proposed framework to ensure the deliverability of scheduled FRCs, as will be presented later.
A WPP's capability to provide FRCs is explained by Fig. 2 . Before an RTED problem is solved for time t * , a WPP submits its energy offer denoted by point A 0 and its ramp rate limit. The expected and actual output of the WPP at (t * + 1) are represented by B 0 and B * respectively. 1) Upward FRC: a WPP must deload (e.g. to point A 1 ) to provide upward FRC. Compared with letting the WPP freely moving from the maximum output at t * to B * , conducting deloading leaves the system with more controllable capacity for the subsequent periods, quantified as (A 0 − A 1 ). For conservativeness, we can limit the WPP's capability of providing upward FRC by the lower quantile of forecasted wind power distribution at a specific confidence level (1−α). Therefore, the WPP's capability to provide upward FRC can be expressed by
2) Downward FRC: the WPP's capability to provide downward FRC mainly depends on the wind power availability at (t * + 1) because downward FRC is deployed by conducting curtailment. To ensure the deliverability of the downward FRC, we also limit the capacity of providing downward FRC by the lower quantile of the distribution. Therefore, the WPP's capability to provide downward FRC can be expressed by Then, from the economic perspective, it is important to guarantee that utilizing the WPPs' flexibility can indeed bring benefits to the systems, and meanwhile, the WPPs do have the incentives to provide these services when this is cost efficient for the system. Otherwise, introducing WPPs as FRC providers cannot be seen as a Pareto improvement, and thus is not acceptable for market design.
Firstly, we acknowledge that the WPPs usually have higher opportunity costs than conventional units to provide FRCs due to their low marginal production cost. Additionally, the final deployment or withdrawing of scheduled FRCs might cause further wind power spillage, which is also unfavorable. However, utilizing WPPs' flexibility can help reduce the use of more expensive fast-start units or avoid other temporary corrective actions. Therefore, though some opportunity costs may be incurred, it is still comparatively advantageous sometimes to schedule FRCs from the WPPs, especially for systems that lack an adequate supply of ramp resources. Moreover, as will be presented later, the proposed decision model will choose to purchase FRCs from the WPPs only when the system performance can be improved. In other words, enabling the WPPs to provide FRCs only adds more flexibility to the system operation without bringing negative impacts to social welfare, which can be regarded as a merit for market design. If the overall system costs can indeed be reduced and the WPPs are reasonably compensated, the proposed idea could be economically viable.
III. TWO-STAGE REAL-TIME UNIT COMMITMENT CONSIDERING FRC ADEQUACY

A. RT Operation Process Overview
To cope with the uncertainties, multiple system scheduling procedures with different lead times are conducted by the system operators. Some of them are also market processes, while others are only for reliability concerns. In [35, Fig. 1 ] provides a good demonstration of the relationships among these procedures and the uncertainty levels they are associated with. Fig. 3 in this paper is modified accordingly to show mainly the RT operation process, which we define to include the RTUC and RTED. As illustrated by the figure, with the increasing lead time, the level of uncertainty faced by the system increases, as represented by the size of the circles. Additionally, the size of the circles also stands for the complexity of the decision problems because less flexibility, represented by the control variables, is available and considered when it is closer to the final delivery of energy.
RTUC is also called look-ahead unit commitment. It typically runs every 15 min, with a study period of hours and a resolution of 15 or 30 min. RTUC decides only the commitment of fast-start units whereas the slow-start units are usually dispatched by the day-ahead (DA) scheduling processes, which means that the complexity of an RTUC is much lower than the DA unit commitment. The target of RTUC is to guarantee sufficient flexibility for RT operation. After an RTUC is solved, the system must schedule sufficient FRCs from the given generation portfolio in subsequent RTEDs to keep itself capable of moving from one status to another. Between two RTEDs, there is no more scheduling process, and the AGC works continuously to balance the supply and demand.
The RTUC problem can be formulated either in a deterministic form with given FRC requirements or as a stochastic programming problem without explicit FRC constraints [7] . Following the real-world operation process, the FRCs are actually procured and priced in the RTED problem rather than RTUC. Therefore, in an RTUC, it is more reasonable and practical to consider the feasibility of obtaining adequate FRCs in the RTED than to directly consider the FRC sufficiency given that the realized load and wind profiles are uncertain when the RTUC is conducted. This leads to the formulation of a two-stage stochastic RTUC (TS-RTUC) problem. Such a model is presented in the next subsection as the potential alternative for future RT market implementation and is used to reveal the effects of including the WPPs as FRC providers.
B. TS-RTUC Problem Formulation
The first stage of the TS-RTUC problem is a 15-min resolution RTUC problem. The second stage describes the subsequent 5-min resolution RTED process. The objective function can be formulated as the expected operational costs of the system including the commitment and fuel costs as well as the costs for load shedding and FRC shortages. The TS-RTUC problem attempts to minimize the overall costs, as expressed by
which is subject to the following: i) First-stage constraints Unit commitment constraints Ramp constraints of the units 
The unit commitment variables are first-stage variables and are constrained by (4) . The remaining control variables are decided at the second stage and constrained by (5)-(9). Constraint (5) represents the system power balance. Constraint (6) describes the capacity constraints of the units. Constraint (7) guarantees that the total regulation reserve capacity reaches the required amount. Constraints (8) are related to the ramping capability, among which (8a), (8b) restrict the scheduled outputs of the units with their maximum ramp rates. Constraints (8c)-(8f) mean that the units can only provide FRCs within their ramp limits. Additionally, the ramp capability within a 10-min time scale is shared between the scheduled FRCs and regulation reserves [9] . For the units that can be complete their startup and shutdown within 5 min, constraint (8g) means that a unit can be started up to provide upward FRC within its SURR. Similarly, constraint (8h) means that a unit can be shut down to provide downward FRC within its SDRR.
However, some other fast-start units cannot complete their startup or shutdown within 5 min, meaning that they might be in their startup/shutdown processes and are uncontrollable when an RTED is calculated. This can be regarded as a part of the passive load variation [37] . It is difficult to describe such processes precisely. However, they can still be modeled based on realistic assumptions. First, we categorize the fast-start units into two groups. The very fast ones, including small gas turbines and hydro units, are grouped as Type I units, which are assumed to take 5 min to start up or shut down. The rest ones, tagged by Type II, are assumed to take exactly 15 min. The startup and shutdown trajectories of the Type II units are assumed to be piecewise linear, which is an approximation of the real ones. This assumption is made to reach a balance between the modeling accuracy and the tractability of the problem [38] . The parameters of the piece-wise linearization can be estimated based on the real trajectories for each unit. See constraints (9d)-(9e); the output of the units is limited by the auxiliary bounds, which will close to a single trajectory when the unit is in its commitment process. The trajectory is decided by the constraints (A1)-(A12) in the Appendix, which describe the startup/shutdown characteristics of the units. It should be noted that the approximation can be further elaborated by introducing more constraints for better precision. Moreover, the passive ramping processes are considered in the net load variation, which can be represented by
In addition, type II units which are their startup and shutdown processes are unable to provide flexibility; therefore, 
Finally, for every possible scenario, we must guarantee that adequate FRCs can be procured. That is to say, we are not attempting to cover all possibilities in the RTUC problem because the scenarios are limited. Instead, sufficient flexibility is guaranteed in each scenario to cover further uncertainties. It is somehow closer to the real-world process as discussed above. 
The first two terms in (12a), (12b) represent the expected passive variation of the loads, consisting of changes in loads, wind power and uncontrollable ramping of the type II units. The last term represents an extra margin, decided mainly based upon the distribution and specified confidence level of the load and wind power forecast error [36] . The decision model without considering WPPs as FRC providers can be expressed as min f s. (14) In this research, we do not consider the non-convexities in the pricing process. In other words, the RT market is cleared by a continuous linear model with all the binary variables fixed at their optimal value. Then, because FRCs are co-optimized with energy, the opportunity cost of providing FRCs and not producing energy (or producing energy at a loss) are automatically compensated by the FRC prices [1] (for the proof, readers may refer to [39] ). This is consistent with the current market mechanism and fair to the WPPs because they do not have major non-convexities in their bidding behavior. Certainly, it might be an interesting topic for future study to consider the FRC products in the non-convex pricing frameworks [40] , [41] .
t. (4)−(13), (A1)−(A12)
C. Consider WPPs as FRC Providers
However, only compensating the opportunity cost for the current period is insufficient. When some of the FRCs are procured from the WPPs, the system might have even less flexibility provided by the traditionally defined FRC sources. Consequently, the possibility of wind power spillage would increase. Considering that this risk is not reflected by the opportunity costs defined above, one can argue that extra compensation should be given to the WPPs. A possible way to cope with this issue is to allow the WPPs to submit nonzero FRC bids to the system to show how much they value the risks and want to be compensated. Therefore, the objective function can be modified aŝ (2), (4)- (12), (14), (A1), (A12) A reasonable evaluation on the values of π u and π d is not straightforward and is outside the scope of this paper. A possible option to obtain their values is to conduct statistical analysis. However, including such compensation is relatively neutral to the model. If the integrated costs of the WPP-provided FRCs are too high, the optimization problem will automatically choose not to use them.
It should be noted that by including the WPPs as FRC providers, we do not aim at changing the way in which the systems are operated. The objective function is still to minimize the system costs, and the only difference is that more flexibilities, represented by additional controllable variables, are included in the decision mode. Therefore, the social welfare is at least not impaired after the change is made. In systems those lack ramping resources, the values of the WPPs will be revealed. As long as the decision model chooses to schedule FRCs from G1  300  300  0  0  0  10  0  0  G2  150  50  3  4  4  20  300 300  G3  200  50  3  4  4  40  300 600  G4  150  50  3  5  5  60  300 900  G5  100  10  6  6  6  120  0  0 the WPPs, the social welfare is improved compared with the situation in which WPPs are kept away from the FRC markets.
Considering that the TS-RTUC problem is applied at realtime stage with limited lead time, computational performance is a major concern. Based on [42] , an L-shaped method, which is showed to be efficient in solving the stochastic unit commitment problems, is applied in this paper. The algorithm procedures are presented in the Appendix.
IV. CASE STUDY: MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
Following [13] , we use a system including five units in our studies. The unit data (see Table I ) are modified based on [13] . Among the units, G1 is a base-load unit, and G2-G5 are faststart units with increasing fuel cost rates; the overall fuel cost of a unit is assumed to be linear and can be expressed by C i (p) = a i p + b i . According to the definition in Section III, G2-G4 are type II units, whereas G5 is a type I. A wind farm with an installed capacity of 150 MW is included in the system. The maximum ramp rate of the wind farm is set at 20 MW/min.
In practice, the RTUC problem is solved in a rolling manner. However, due to the limited data availability, we consider only a non-rolling 1-h study period and assume that no new forecast information is provided within the hour. The study period includes 4 RTUC points and 12 RTED points. To avoid artificially increasing the need for FRCs, we assume that the uncertainty level remains the same as the first 15 min throughout the study period. In practice, the rolling approach can help reduce the uncertainty by using the updated forecasts, thus reducing the need for the FRCs. However, because we also ignore the timevariant characteristic of forecast accuracy, the impact of using the non-rolling model is limited.
The extra upward and downward FRC margins, i.e., ξ + and ξ − are assumed to be linear functions of system-level forecasts of load and wind power, which can be expressed as follows: power data is modified based on [44] . For each TS-RTUC, 5000 scenarios are generated for both load and wind power. The scenario sets are both reduced to 10 scenarios using the fast forward selection technique proposed in [45] , resulting in 100 scenarios in total for decision making. And another 2500 scenarios are generated in similar ways for simulation. The adequacy of reduced scenarios should be tested afterwards by comparing the optimized and the simulated costs. The load and wind power is assumed to follow a normal distribution and a beta distribution respectively. The standard deviation of load and wind power forecast are assumed to be 0.5% and 1% of the expectation. In addition, it is assumed that the WPP always offers its expected wind power to the system; i.e.,P w j,t,s =P w j,t,s . Additionally, VOLL is set to $4000/MWh, and the FRC scarcity price is $1000/MWh. The optimization problems are implemented in a Matlab environment and solved by Gurobi Optimizer on an Intel i5-5200u-4G platform.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
First, several single-hour cases are carried out to demonstrate how a WPP can act as an FRC provider. Fig. 4 presents the expected load and wind power profiles during a certain hour. Based on the profiles, the TS-RTUC problems with and without the WPP providing FRCs are solved for comparison, denoted by "W-FRC", "NW-FRC" respectively.
A. Single-Hour Cases
The unit commitment results are shown in Table II , which indicate that by introducing the WPP as an FRC provider, the commitment of the very expensive unit G5 is avoided. Moreover, although extra compensation is given to the WPP (π + = π − = $20/MWh), the expected overall cost is still reduced by 5.5% compared with the NW-FRC case. Fig. 5 presents the average portfolio of FRC provision in the two cases. The comparison clearly presents the way in which the WPP contributes to the system flexibility. To elaborate, for the first half-hour, the FRCs provided by the WPP make it unnecessary to start G5 in the W-FRC case. For the second half hour, the results show that the system experiences a shortage of FRCs in some rare scenarios in the NW-FRC case during 45 ∼ 50 min. However, because of the very low probability, G5 is not started for economic consideration. In contrast, in the W-FRC case, the FRC requirement can always be satisfied. The expected wind power curtailments are 0.6072 MWh for the W-FRC case and 0.1914 MWh for the NW-FRC case. The increase in wind power curtailment is because the WPP reduces its output to provide upward FRCs in the W-FRC case. Despite the loss of wind power, the WPP is expected to earn a $56.24 credit for the service it provides. As long as the system is better off and the WPP can be reasonably compensated, a moderate amount of wind power curtailment is acceptable. Table III provides a brief summary of three other typical cases. The results indicate that when the system has no lack of ramp capability, the WPP will not be chosen to provide FRCs (case 1). This is because of the relatively higher costs of WPP-provided FRCs. As the ramping requirement increases (case 2 and case 3), the value of having WPP to provide FRCs also increases, which implies that, although unnecessary now, in the future, when the system is deeply penetrated by wind power and other variable generation technologies, the idea of including WPPs as FRC providers might be a better choice than using only the conventional units. 
B. Multi-Hour Cases
In this subsection, cases including 216 consecutive hours, i.e., 9 days, are studied to further illustrate the effects of WPPprovided FRCs. When the parameters are the same as in the previous subsection, the expected generation costs for the W-FRC and NW-FRC cases are shown in Fig. 6. Fig. 7 presents the ratio of cost reduction sorted by magnitude (the optimized expected generation costs have been compared with the simulated expected costs, and for most scenarios the error is less than 0.2%). The results indicate that costs are reduced by more than 1% for over 40% of the period, and 2% for over 30% of the period and that the cost is never higher in the W-FRC case. Fig. 8 shows the expected overall running hours of the units under the two cases. As expected, the running hours of the expensive unit G5 are remarkably reduced in the W-FRC case. In Fig. 9 , the expected wind power curtailment under both cases and the FRC credits earned under the W-FRC case are demonstrated. It is illustrated that, for most hours, more wind power will be curtailed in the W-FRC case because the WPP is scheduled to provide upward FRC service. However, again, the amount is moderate, and it is compensated by the FRC credits. Additionally, for some hours, the WPP does not have to be curtailed to earn credits because they can simply provide downward FRC service.
However, before claiming that the WPPs can benefit from offering FRC services, it is important to examine how the WPPs' revenue from selling energy is impacted. However, this could be very controversial because the WPPs' revenue from selling energy is not solely decided by the RT markets. In fact, it is a major trend that the WPPs participate in the DA markets just like other market players. In a typical two-settlement market, only the deviation from DA schedules are cleared at the RT prices. Therefore, reporting the WPPs' revenue based on the RT prices in these cases may lead to the wrong conclusion.
Instead, the RT prices themselves are more representative. Considering that the net position of the WPPs is uncertain in real time (can be either positive or negative), the WPPs will be in favor of more stable RT prices because volatile prices will incur higher risks. See Fig. 10 , in the W-FRC case, the possibility of having the expensive G5 as the marginal units are effectively reduced, which is illustrated by the eliminated price spikes.
Additionally, it is shown that the RT prices in the NW-FRC are sometimes lower than in the W-FRC case. This is because the minimum output requirements of the G5 may shift the system supply curve to the right. Comparatively, the WPP helps reduce the use of G5 and recover the prices from an unexpectedly low level. By reducing the volatility of RT prices, both the system and the WPPs themselves are better off.
Finally, some sensitivity analyses are carried out. First, the effects of different compensation factors for WPP-provided FRCs are examined. Table IV provides a summary of the test results, which indicate that by providing an appropriate amount of compensation, the system cost is reduced and the WPP may also be better off. Note that the WPP receives a significant FRC credit even when the compensation factor is zero. Moreover, even when the compensation level is very high, i.e., more than $40/MWh, there is still a significant reduction in the overall generation cost and running hours of G5, meaning that even when the FRCs provided by WPPs are highly priced, it is still more economical to use them to cover the FRC requirements than to keep the expensive fast-start units standing by. Fig. 11 illustrates the ratios of the expected FRC credits of the WPP against the system cost reduction with different compensation factors. The ratios are relatively small because the FRCs are provided by the WPPs only in very limited scenarios, but it helps avoid committing the fast-start units, which influences all the scenarios. The results indicate that by including WPPs as FRC providers, the social welfare is improved, and a certain portion of the additional benefits are allocated to the WPPs. Combining the previous discussions, the results also suggest that the WPPs do have the incentive to offer their ramping capability to the system because they benefit not only from the FRC credits but also from the stabilized RT prices. Table V presents the comparison of results under different levels of uncertainties considered in the RTED process. The trends imply that the value of WPPs' providing FRCs is more significant in situations with higher uncertainties. In lower uncertainty cases the WPP is not frequently scheduled to provide FRCs because of the underlying opportunity costs and extra compensation. Similar to Fig. 10, Fig. 12 shows the comparison of average energy prices between the NW-FRC and W-FRC cases with increased level of uncertainty (η l,u , η l,d = 0.012, and η w ,u , η w ,d = 0.060). More frequent price spikes appear in the NW-FRC cases but they are still effectively avoided in the W-FRC case. The results suggest a greater value of the WPPs in higher uncertainty conditions. However, the resulting win-win situation does not mean that the WPPs will not attempt to search for further gaming opportunities. For example, if a WPP has a large positive position in real time, it might try to hold back its ramping capability to create price spikes. To perform an intensive study on the WPP strategic behavior, some more complicated tools such mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) should be used [29] , which might be an interesting topic for future research. However, in the current study, the potential bidding behavior does not significantly change the conclusions because even if the WPPs strategically hold back their ramping capability, the social welfare is not impaired compared with the situation in which the WPPs are not considered FRC providers. Certainly, to ensure the effectiveness of the proposed framework in practical use, it is still important to guarantee that the hypothetical benefits are not offset by the gaming activities of the players by careful rule design. For the computational performance, the average solution time of the 216 cases is 4.58 s using the L-shaped method, and 10.83 s when the model is solved simply as a mixed-integer linear programming problem.
VI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS
In this paper, the mechanism and possibility of including WPPs as FRC providers have been explored. Although with the nature uncertainty and variability, WPPs are capable of providing FRCs with reliable performance. But it is also noticeable that the WPPs are not advantageous in providing such capacitybased services because of their low marginal costs and the increased likelihood of being curtailed. However, as the needs for FRCs significantly increase, the participation of WPPs in this market is expected to significantly reduce the commitment of expensive fast-start unit, and reduce the risk of insufficient ramping capacity in the RT operation processes.
To reveal these effects, a TS-RTUC problem considering FRC adequacy is formulated. In this model, the first stage represents the RTUC of which the target is to guarantee that adequate FRCs can be obtained in the subsequent RTED processes, considering load and wind power uncertainties described by scenarios. The second stage is the RTED problem that co-optimizes energy, reserve and FRC products. Case studies based on this model demonstrate that WPPs' providing FRC services give significant reductions in overall system costs, and WPPs may also earn significant FRC credits depending on the compensation scheme. The model can be extended and applied to markets in which the look-ahead (multi-period) ED tool is used.
Essentially, FRCs can also be provided by many other flexible resources in addition to conventional units and the WPPs, such as energy storage systems and responsive demands. Those resources can also be incorporated into the decision model in similar ways. However, providing FRCs usually incurs costs for the market participants. If we assume that the FRCs provided by different participants are of equal quality, then the most decisive factor is the cost of supply. Considering that many WPPs with great controllability are already distributed in the worldwide power systems, the WPPs are at least competitive participants in the current FRC markets. Certainly, with the decreasing costs of energy storage systems and the loads becoming more intelligent, it is also possible that WPPs will be replaced by other technologies. In this paper, we do not aim at picking out the best technology for providing FRCs by making comparisons of the complicated and varying costs of providing FRCs. We believe that as long as it is technologically feasible, no resource should be kept away from the FRC market, and we should let the market decide the merit order of the FRC resources.
In the future, we plan to extend this study to real systems with current or planned future wind power penetration levels to test the practical feasibility and economic efficiency of using wind power as FRC sources.
APPENDIX
A. Startup/Shutdown Processes
